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Combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that different types of military 
forces must be integrated to effectively counter evolving threats. Senior Army leaders 
have identified the need to retain the ability to effectively integrate conventional and 
special operations forces.  Integration should not aim to combine forces to the point they 
are indistinguishable, but should maximize the effects of each force’s unique capabilities. 
This thesis concludes that in the future, conventional and special operations forces 
integration should be addressed with the following tenets:  
• integration should be determined by the task, not the unit 
• integrated operations require a dedicated staff at the joint task force level 
• the supported/supporting command relationship is most appropriate and 
should be determined by task 
It also proposes a methodology that enables the identification of task interdependencies 
between conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF). Identifying these 
interdependencies informs staffs and commanders where integrated operations are best 
conducted. The design structure matrix, an approach used in the business and systems 
engineering sectors, provides a basis for the methodology. The goal of this campaign 
planning tool is cross-force synergy emerging from utilization of the unique capabilities 
of CF and SOF for maximum gains.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The last decade of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that 
different types of military forces must be able to work together in order to effectively 
counter modern threats.  One of the most significant shifts occurred in the United States 
Army, where conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF), traditionally 
separated in both training and combat, have worked closely together. Senior Army 
leaders identified the need to continue to effectively integrate conventional and special 
operations forces in the future. This thesis proposes a methodology that enables 
identification of high level task interdependencies between conventional forces (CF) and 
special operations forces (SOF). Identifying these interdependencies informs staffs and 
commanders where integrated operations are best conducted. The design structure matrix, 
an approach used in the business and commercial sectors provides the basis for the 
methodology. The goal of this campaign planning tool is cross-force synergy emerging 
from utilization of the unique capabilities of CF and SOF for maximum gains. This task 
first requires a review of the existing literature relevant to the topic as a conceptual 
foundation for further examination. 
A. THREAT ENVIRONMENT AND HYBRID WARFARE 
One of the most challenging tasks that senior military leaders face is accurately 
predicting the nature of future conflicts and preparing the United States military 
appropriately.  Prior to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the United States Army 
focused the majority of its training efforts on conducting combat operations in high 
intensity conflict (HIC).  After the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States 
Army adjusted its training strategy to meet the challenges of these new operating 
environments.  The Army was able to adapt its tactics to better conduct 
counterinsurgency and stability operations.    
As operations in Afghanistan draw down, senior military leaders must determine 
the path that the United States Army should take in preparing for future conflicts.  Some 
advocates believe that the United States Army should return its focus to high intensity 
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conflicts. Others argue that the United States Army should maintain its focus on 
counterinsurgency and stability operations, also known as low intensity conflict (LIC).   
Recently, military theorists have developed a third scenario, hybrid warfare, that 
combines elements of both high and low intensity conflicts.  This section presents several 
definitions and characteristics of hybrid warfare, and proposes a common definition used 
in this thesis. 
In 2005, Frank G. Hoffman was one of the first defense analysts to utilize the 
term “hybrid warfare.”  In Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, he 
argues that future operational environments will consist of a combination of regular and 
irregular tactics specifically designed to target U.S. vulnerabilities.1  Hoffman states: 
“Hybrid Wars can be waged by states or political groups, and incorporate a range of 
different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and 
formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal 
disorder.”2 The term hybrid not only describes the tactics but also describes these new 
adversaries’ organizations.  Hybrid threat groups may have a hierarchical command 
structure that oversees many decentralized or networked tactical units.3  Hoffman 
acknowledges that at the strategic level several forms of warfare can exist 
simultaneously.  In hybrid warfare, “these forces become blurred into the same force in 
the same battlespace…”4 In Joint Forces Quarterly, Hoffman later describes the 
evolution of warfare as a convergence of methods of warfare.  “The evolving character of 
conflict that we currently face is best characterized by convergence.  This includes the 
convergence of the physical and psychological, the kinetic and non-kinetic, and 
combatants and noncombatants.”5  Hybrid threat organizations will often operate in 
restrictive terrain, or as Hoffman calls them, contested zones, such as dense urban jungles 
                                                 
1 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Arlington: Potomac 
Institute for Policy Studies, 2007, 8. 
2 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 58. 
3 Ibid, 28. 
4 Ibid, 8. 
5 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 2009, 34. 
 3 
and congested littoral areas.6  Hoffman warns against the bifurcation of the U.S. military 
into specialized forces.  He states that hybrid warfare requires a force possessing robust 
and integrated combined arms capabilities.  “This will require military forces that are not 
merely ‘general purpose’ but professional multi-purpose units with flexibility and 
credible combat power.”7 
The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War provides an example of a non-state actor, 
Hezbollah, employing hybrid tactics to pose significant operational challenges to a 
conventional military force, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).  In Military Capabilities for 
Hybrid War: Insights from the Israel Defense Forces in Lebanon and Gaza, David 
Johnson highlights the challenges that the IDF faced as they encountered an adversary 
operating in the middle range of military operations.8  Prior to the 2006 conflict, the IDF 
focused almost entirely on counterinsurgency and stability operations, leaving them 
incapable of combined arms maneuver.9  Hezbollah in Lebanon were not a purely 
irregular opponent or a conventional state actor-like force. They operated in the middle 
ground with the ability to easily transition from irregular to conventional tactics.10  
Hezbollah was well trained, and organized into small units armed with a wide array of 
modern weaponry.11  Johnson offers lessons learned from Israel and recommendations 
for the U.S. Army in preparing for future hybrid threats.  First, the U.S. Army’s almost 
exclusive focus on preparing for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq will hinder its ability to defeat a hybrid opponent.  Johnson argues that hybrid 
opponents present a challenge that demands combined arms fire and maneuver, despite 
the relatively small size of their fighting units.12  The effective integration of air, artillery, 
and unmanned aerial system (UAS) assets are vitally important to fighting a hybrid 
                                                 
6 Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century, 15. 
7 Ibid, 47. 
8 David E. Johnson, Military Capabilities for Hybrid Warfare: Insights from the Israeli Defense 
Forces in Lebanon and Gaza, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2010, 2. 
9 Johnson, Military Capabilities for Hybrid Warfare, 3. 
10 Ibid, 5. 
11 Ibid, 3. 
12 Ibid, 7. 
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adversary.  Finally, Johnson highlights the importance of utilizing armor and infantry 
fighting vehicles, supported by medium or light forces, for their survivability, lethality, 
and mobility.13 
Although the Department of Defense (DOD) does not recognize hybrid warfare as 
a new form of conflict, and has not created an operating definition, Joint Publication (JP) 
3-0 has identified the need for the armed forces to maintain the ability to transition from 
one form of warfare to another.  The “Range of Military Operations” model identifies 
three main categories of military operations that vary from military engagements and 
security cooperation, to limited contingency operations and major combat operations.  
While JP 3-0 does not specifically address a hybrid threat scenario, it does state that the 
“…nature of strategic security environment may require U.S. forces to engage in several 
types of joint operations simultaneously across the range of military operations.”14  This 
model makes several fundamental assumptions about the nature of future operating 
environments. First, it states that there is the potential to conduct several different types 
of military operations in the same theater of operations.  However, U.S. military forces 
will be required conduct simultaneous operations along the spectrum of conflict in a 
hybrid warfare environment.  It then assumes that there will be a distinct linear or 
sequential transition between different phases of combat operations.  As described earlier, 
a variety of military operations will be required simultaneously in a theater of operations, 
and will occur in geographically separated areas.  Finally, the JP 3-0 model assumes that 
one force structure is appropriate for all elements within the range of military operations.  
In Operation Iraqi Freedom, a force structure designed for high intensity conflict was not 
inherently well-suited or appropriate for counterinsurgency or stability operations.  
In November 2010, the Department of the Army (DA) published Training 
Circular (TC) 7-100 Hybrid Threat to define and describe how an opponent might 
organize to fight using a hybrid strategy.  It states: 
Hybrid threats are innovative, adaptive, globally connected, networked, 
and embedded in the clutter of local populations.  They can possess a wide 
                                                 
13 Ibid, 8. 
14 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Defense, 2011, V-2. 
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range of old, adapted and advanced technologies—including the 
possibility of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  They can operate 
conventionally and unconventionally, employing adaptive and asymmetric 
combinations of traditional, irregular, and criminal tactics and using 
traditional military capabilities in old and new ways.15 
The circular contends that those using a hybrid strategy will continually adjust their 
organizational structure, tactics, and equipment to create dilemmas for U.S. forces.   
Adversaries will focus their disruptive efforts in every potential sphere of an operating 
environment to include: information, social, political, infrastructure, economic, and 
military domains.   Hybrid warfare actors will attempt to utilize criminals and criminal 
organizations to finance and facilitate operations in this environment.16  Training 
Circular 7-100 identifies two key strategies of a hybrid warfare threat: adaptation and 
transition.  Natural adaptation is the process by which the actor pursuing hybrid warfare 
refines his ability to apply political, economic, military, or informational power.  
Directed adaptation is the application of lessons learned to disrupt U.S. forces in an 
operating environment.17  Transitions refer to the shift in the adversary’s organizational 
and design structure to maximize its ability to blend in with the local population creating 
a new and distinct advantage.  The circular concludes that the traditional concepts of 
conventional vs. unconventional and regular vs. irregular war are of no use in applying to 
adversaries in hybrid warfare, but instead allow them to exploit these principles against 
their potential opponents.18 
A 2010, United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) study for 
Congress examined how the DOD) defines and uses hybrid warfare in strategic planning 
and if hybrid warfare represents a new form of conflict.  According to the GAO, the DOD 
does not have an official definition for hybrid warfare because it does not consider it a 
new form of warfare.19  Many DOD officials assert that hybrid warfare incorporates all 
                                                 
15 Department of the Army, Training Circular 7-100 Hybrid Threat, Fort Leavenworth: Headquarters, 
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 2010, 1-1. 
16 Department of the Army, TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat, 1-2. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid, 1-3. 
19 United States Government Accountability Office, Hybrid Warfare, Washington, D.C.: United States 
Government Accountability Office, 2010, 2. 
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elements of warfare along the spectrum of conflict.  The term “hybrid” is used to describe 
the increasingly complex operating environments that will require the U.S. military to 
maintain a full-spectrum force.20  In this report, the GAO provides the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization’s (NATO) definition of hybrid warfare: “A hybrid threat is one 
posed by any current or potential adversary, including state, non-state and terrorists, with 
the ability, whether demonstrated or likely, to simultaneously employ conventional and 
non-conventional means adaptively, in pursuit of their objectives.”21 
As we have shown, there is still debate concerning whether hybrid warfare 
constitutes a new and emerging threat to the U.S.  military.  The DOD maintains that the 
existing Range of Military Operations model sufficiently captures future threat scenarios.  
An Army view is hybrid threats are not a new phenomenon but that future adversaries are 
likely to employ hybrid tactics to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities.  Hoffman warns that future 
conflicts will likely involve adversaries who will employ a convergence of conventional 
and unconventional tactics and organizations.  In Figure 1, Hoffman illustrates that the 
U.S. military should prepare for mid-intensity conflict, or hybrid warfare, because it 
poses the most operational risk due to its frequency of occurrence and intensity.22   
                                                 
20 U.S. GAO, Hybrid Warfare, 11. 
21 Ibid, 15. 
22 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Threats: Reconceptualizing the Evolving Character of Modern 
Conflict,” Strategic Forum, No. 240, April 2009, 6. 
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Figure 1.  Hoffman’s Implied Change in Spectrum of Conflict (Hoffman, 2007) 
We assume that the likely operational tasks for this mid-intensity conflict will include: 
direct action, counterinsurgency, training and advisory, and anti-terrorism operations.  
This operating environment will require a force structure that places more emphasis on 
unconventional tasks while maintaining the ability to conduct high-intensity operations.  
We contend that the U.S. military cannot afford to classify our military forces in 
conventional or unconventional terms; hybrid warfare will require a combined arms or 
multi-modal force that is capable of operating across the spectrum of military operations.  
B. THESIS STRUCTURE 
The second chapter reviews literature available on the topic of integration of 
conventional and special operations forces.  Organizational theory lends insights from the 
business and systems engineering perspectives. It introduces the design structure matrix 
as a tool for determining where task interdependencies exist, and where integration is 
beneficial.  The chapter examines current Joint and Army doctrine to identify their main 
concepts for dealing with CF-SOF integration.  
 The third chapter describes the use of the design structure matrix as a tool for 
determining where interdependencies exist and where integration could be beneficial.  A 
value system for the design structure matrix identifies each instance of CF-SOF task 
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interdependency and determines where integration of units would be beneficial, harmful, 
or makes no difference. An example demonstrates how a design structure matrix would 
be built, populated, and analyzed. It concludes with identification of the limitations of the 
tool. 
 The fourth and fifth chapters provide two hypothetical case studies in areas of the 
world that could present hybrid warfare environments.  They examine Chechnya and 
Pakistan in terms of historical background, their current situations, and how those 
situations may worsen and present a hybrid warfare situation.  These case studies provide 
context for use of the design structure matrix by presenting notional scenarios where a 
senior commander could examine how integration of his conventional and special 
operations forces could help achieve U.S. objectives. 
 The sixth chapter analyzes design structure matrices developed for the illustrative 
notional Chechen and Pakistani scenarios. The matrices, once completed, offer insight 
into where conventional and special operations forces can achieve better results by 
conducting integrated operations for certain tasks.  The matrices also reflect where it 
would be better to keep the different units separated. This analysis demonstrates how 
commanders and planners can identify where and when to integrate conventional and 
special operations forces by using the design structure matrix.  The final chapter offers 
conclusions and recommendations for using the design structure matrix as a planning tool 
to examine the possibilities for CF-SOF integrated operations.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter reviews literature addressing three topics:  hybrid warfare, Joint and 
Army Doctrine regarding the integration of conventional forces (CF) and special 
operations forces (SOF), and works addressing conventional force-special operations 
force (CF-SOF) integration.  This review examines possible answers to the primary 
questions that already exist. Those questions are: Is the integration of conventional and 
special operations forces beneficial in a hybrid warfare scenario? And if so, when and 
how?  The following sections examine where current doctrine fails to adequately address 
CF-SOF integration against such threats.  Previous works addressing how to better 
integrate CF-SOF suggest where the Army can begin reorganizing and reeducating 
leaders for better integration in more complex operational environments. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY 
In terms of organizational design, the U.S. Army is an excellent example of 
hierarchy and bureaucracy. These models apply historically, and continue to be a good fit 
for military organizations. The current global environment however, may require changes 
to the Army’s organizational structures. The fields of organizational theory and 
organizational design may offer new ways of analyzing the Army’s organizational model 
to address CF-SOF integration.  Work done to study integration in the corporate world 
provides a new lens to examine the integration of CF and SOF units. 
 Henri Barki and Alain Pinsonneault note that while some may perceive 
homogenizing departments to a degree where there are no longer apparent differences as 
the apex of integration, this is not always optimal.  They contend that extreme integration 
can negate the different and complementary skills and expertise that come with 
specialization.23  This is a key consideration when examining CF-SOF integration. CF 
                                                 
23 Henri Barki & Alain Pisonneault, “A Model of Organizational Integration, Implementation Effort 
and Performance,” Organization Science, Vol. 16, No. 2, 166.  
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and SOF will each try to maximize the contributions unique to their particular skills. 24 
The goal should not be to form a CF-SOF hybrid where there is no difference between 
the forces, but rather to utilize the unique capabilities of each individual force for 
maximum gain.  
 Another aspect of CF-SOF integration is the concept of interdependence. In 1967, 
Thompson identified that the most effective structure is one that groups interdependent 
roles and processes together.  This suggests that once tasks requiring SOF-CF integration 
are identified, interdependent staff roles and processes should be put together.  The trick 
about interdependencies is that they are easily misidentified, with the primary tendency 
being to ignore them.25 Headquarters integration of CF and SOF requires grouping of the 
staffs according to interdependencies.  For the sake of time and resources however, if the 
situation does not call for CF-SOF to integrate fully throughout the campaign, a 
systematic approach must be adopted to determine where interdependencies exist.  The 
most effective approach will be one that allows for integration of CF-SOF where high 
levels of interdependency exist, and separation where they do not.26  
The design structure matrix (DSM) is an effective tool for identifying where 
interdependencies exist.  This tool allows for better visualization of where parts of a 
system exhibit interdependence, and where they are autonomous. By mapping the 
departments of an organization, or the tasks performed by organizations working 
together, the DSM can illuminate where integration is beneficial. The methods chapter 
addresses the DSM and its applicability to CF-SOF integration in more depth.  
C. INTEGRATING BY THE BOOK  
Examining current Joint and Army doctrine shows how the military, as an 
institution, believes that integration should be approached.  Current Army and Joint 
doctrine focuses on units working together in traditional, high-intensity combat 
situations, not adequately addressing how to integrate CF and SOF at the operational 
                                                 
24 Barki & Pisonneault, “A Model of Organizational Integration,” 170. 
25 Nicolay Worren. “Hitting the Sweet Spot Between Separation and Integration in Organization 
Design.” People and Strategy.  Vol. 34 Issue 4, 25. 
26 Worren, “Hitting the Sweet Spot Between Separation and Integration,” 26. 
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level in complex environments. This chapter structures the review of doctrine by focusing 
on the integration concepts found in Joint Publication 3-05 Special Operations; these are 
operations, command relationships, and liaisons.27   
1. Operations 
JP 3-05 recommends that CF-SOF begin planning integrated operations “…at the 
first efforts at mission development and concluding with the achievement of the desired 
end state.”28  This indicates that for an operation to be truly integrated, it must be planned 
as such from the initial development of the operational concept, through conflict 
termination.  Focusing on CF-SOF integration receives no other specific attention in the 
current literature. 
2. Command Relationships 
Command relationships can sometimes be a very contentious issue for military 
leaders. JP 3-05 provides that leaders conducting integrated operations will need to shift 
from a vertical focus, receiving orders from a higher headquarters, to a horizontal focus 
of working closely with partners.29  This mental shift can prove critical. If the focus 
remains on who works for whom, then this aspect will remain a barrier to integration.  
Joint Publication 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, provides joint forces with 
guidance for achieving an integrated command structure, but not in the sense CF-SOF 
integration. JP 3-33 offers a NATO headquarters as an example, providing these main 
factors for an integrated command: 
• a designated single commander 
• a staff composed of members from all partner nations 
• subordinate commands and staff integrated into the lowest echelon 
necessary to accomplish the mission.30 
                                                 
27 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-05: Special Operations. Washington, D.C.: Department 
of Defense, III-11. 
28 Department of Defense, JP 3-05: Special Operations, III-11. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-33: Joint Task Force Headquarters, Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense, IV-19. 
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JP 3-33’s guidance does not rely on the use of liaisons to achieve an integrated command 
structure, but rather on creating a staff that is representative of the types of units involved 
in the operation (partner nations). It is possible to look at CF-SOF units as “partner 
nations” for integrated operations and to form one staff responsible to an overall 
command authority, either conventional or SOF, for planning and executing operations. 
3. Liaison Elements 
Liaison elements receive the most attention when dealing with CF-SOF 
integration. Doctrinally, the primary vehicle is the Special Operations Command and 
Control Element (SOCCE).  This team is described in Joint Publication 3-05, Special 
Operations, as the “focal point for the synchronization of activities with conventional 
force operations.” Normally utilized when SOF is acting in support of CF, the SOCCE 
performs command and control, as well as liaison functions as directed by the local SOF 
commander. It is important to note that SOCCE remains under the operational control 
(OPCON) of its SOF commander, while working and living with the supported CF 
headquarters. The SOCCE performs the following functions: 
• as directed, executes C2 of SOF elements attached or in direct support of 
the supported CF commander 
• advises CF commander on SOF capabilities and limitations 
• advises the SOF commander on the supported CF’s status, intentions, and 
requirements 
• provides required secure communications links 
• coordinates and de-conflicts SO activities with CF operations 
• assists supported commander with CF-SOF staff link-up31 
The SOCCE is an attractive option because it can serve both as a liaison element and 
function as a command element for SOF working in support of the CF commander.  The 
SOCCE, however will not truly function as an integrated element of the headquarters, 
and remains a very robust liaison cell, as long as it is OPCON to a separate SOF 
commander.  
                                                 
31 Department of Defense, JP 3-05: Special Operations, II-12. 
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According to JP 3-05, another method for CF-SOF integration is the exchange of 
SOF liaison officers (LNOs).  LNOs report directly to the SOF commander, but are 
positioned within the supported CF components to ensure the timely exchange of 
information to aid mission execution and to prevent fratricide, duplication of effort, 
disruption of operations or the loss of intelligence sources.32 This is a well-known, and 
often utilized method of keeping units working under the same command, or in the same 
areas, apprised of each other’s actions.  Most headquarters will have LNOs from each of 
their subordinate units, as well as any units operating inside or around their operational 
area. Their continued use suggests that both CF and SOF leaders feel comfortable with 
LNOs during training and operations. 
Making the LNO the centerpiece of integration leaves much to be desired in 
achieving integration.  The roles and responsibilities of LNOs, as outlined in doctrine, 
allow for SOF and CF to coexist in the same operational environment and avoid 
fratricide, but do not allow for them to become truly integrated. In Army doctrine, 
specifically the Corps Operations manual, liaisons serve four functions: to monitor, 
coordinate, advise, and assist.33  Joint Doctrine, as outlined in JP 3-33 Joint Task Force 
Headquarters, provides guidelines for LNOs: 
• LNOs are not full-time planners 
• LNOs are not replacements for proper staff-to-staff coordination 
• LNOs do not have the authority to make decisions for their commander 
without coordination and approval34 
This demonstrates that liaisons are not meant to achieve integration. While LNOs are 
vital to achieving coordination, they do not have the presence, role, or authorities 
required to achieve integration of units during planning or execution.  
A 2010 RAND study explores liaisons being used in CF-SOF coordination, and 
recommends changes for future improvement. This study cites the heavy requirements 
often placed on SOF commands to provide LNO’s to supported CF headquarters.  RAND 
                                                 
32 Ibid, II-13. 
33 Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-92: Corps Operations, Washington, D.C.: Department of 
the Army, 5-12. 
34 Department of Defense, JP 3-33: Joint Task Force Headquarters, II-19. 
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cites a 2005 Center for Army Lessons Learned publication showing that during the early 
phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom entire Special Forces A-Teams were dismantled in 
order to provide members of the required liaison teams.35  While this was probably 
viewed as a necessary evil, and expected to be a short-term commitment, having to break 
up operational units in order to fill LNO billets demonstrates a critical lack of capability.  
The same RAND study recommends that the burden should be shared both ways.  A 
specialized SOF liaison element could be established that would be attached to the Joint 
Task Force (JTF) headquarters. Another, conventional force “Coordination Detachment” 
could be formed to augment a theater special operations command (TSOC) or Joint 
Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters to aid in mission planning.36  
Doctrine has yet to explore the option of creating these elements as organic staff 
components of each headquarters, or at minimum as designated, habitual exchanges 
between operational CF and SOF headquarters personnel. 
  The issue of CF-SOF integration has been addressed primarily in the context of 
major combat operations.  CF-SOF integration has not adequately been applied to the 
context of more ambiguous, hybrid threat scenarios. The issue is primarily addressed to 
achieve, at minimum coexistence, and at best synchronization of actions in the same 
operational environment.  There remains a break between what is considered “special 
operations” and “everything else.”  This divergence could prove detrimental to the U.S. 
military’s ability to cope with future threats that do not present problems easily solved by 
A or B-type choices.  Keeping the current focus creates the perception that integration is 
a problem to be dealt with, as opposed a way to exploit the greater opportunities 
presented by truly integrated operations.  
D. CONVENTIONAL FORCES – SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES 
INTEGRATION 
Significant literature exists outside of official doctrine contributing to CF-SOF 
integration. Multiple issues relevant to CF-SOF integration emerge from these sources 
                                                 
35 Timothy M. Bonds, Et Al., Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities, Santa Monica: 
RAND Corporation, 88.  
36 Bonds, Et Al., Enhancing Army Joint Force Headquarters Capabilities, 90-91.  
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and are examined in this chapter. These trends from the literature are: integrated 
operations are determined by task, not by unit; integrated operations require unity of 
command; integration requires dedicated, possibly organic SOF staff support at the JTF 
level (this implies the creation of permanent CF-SOF exchange elements); and, a 
supported/supporting command-support relationship is the most effective. 
In 1994, Michael Kershaw argued that integrated operations require more than mere 
cooperation, and that they are determined by task, not by unit.37  This perspective 
demonstrates that when determining what aspects of an operational plan require CF-SOF 
integration the analysis should focus on what tasks can be better accomplished by 
integrating forces, not by focusing on how many units have mutual CF-SOF 
representation.38 
Harry S. Brown, in 1996, approached CF-SOF integration by focusing the issue of 
unity of command.  Brown describes unity of command by stating that it encompasses 
two concepts: the idea of the commander who is not biased, and the development of a 
unified team.39  Brown offers the lack of integration during the invasion of Grenada, 
Operation Urgent Fury, as a case study in how parochialism and lack of impartiality 
negatively affected operations.40  Brown’s observation supports the idea that for 
operations to be truly integrated, they must be conducted under a single commander. 
It is generally accepted that the last decade of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq has 
resulted in perhaps the best working relationships between CF and SOF in recent history. 
This has occurred out of necessity as CF and SOF units have had to find ways to work 
together and counter multiple types of threats.  In 2012, Generals Sacolick and Grigsby 
argue that this level of integration, based mainly on personal relationships and 
experiences over the last ten years will not last, and cannot prove of future use to the 
Army unless knowledge is institutionalized. They stress that these lessons must be 
                                                 
37 Michael M. Kershaw.  The Integration of Special Operations and Conventional Forces.  Naval 
Postgraduate School Thesis. December 1994. 6-7. 
38 Kershaw, The Integration of Special Operations and Conventional Forces, 131.  
39 Harry S. Brown. The Command and Control of Special Operations Forces.  NPS Thesis.  December 
1996. 1-2. 
40 Brown, The Command and Control of Special Operations Forces, 98. 
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institutionalized, beginning in the generating force, the Army’s schools and Centers of 
Excellence.  Once integration becomes part of the Army’s approach to education, it will 
spread to operational units in the field.41  Sacolick and Grigsby recommend adding new 
functional cells to the Army’s staff structure.  These cells would govern the 
synchronization of CF and SOF operations, drawing both frameworks closer and 
integrating their capabilities for the joint force commander.42 While intended to be part 
of a new “Special Operations Warfighting Function,” this recommendation is one of the 
first to propose creating an organic integration mechanism inside operational staffs.  
In 2008, retired General Gary Luck and Colonel Mike Findlay approached the 
integration of CF-SOF for Joint Forces Command.  Luck and Findlay found a recurring 
need for the incorporation of SOF expertise and perspectives into strategic planning and 
for more clearly defined the relationships between Theater Special Operations 
Commands and established Joint Task Force headquarters. They argue that this requires 
dedicated, and possibly organic, SOF staff support at the JTF level.43 
An information paper published following the Army’s Unified Quest 2012 
exercise addresses the need to better integrate CF-SOF in future conflicts.  The paper 
argues that in future conflict the required force will not be either CF or SOF, but a mix of 
the two. Unified Quest demonstrated that attention should be given to the possibility of 
forming temporary or permanent CF planning and coordination elements assigned to SOF 
commands, as well as SOF planning and coordination elements assigned to CF 
commands.44 
Luck and Findlay contend that the joint doctrinal concept of supporting/supported 
command relationships is best for achieving CF-SOF integrated operations.  This 
relationship requires the supporting commander to aid or assist the supported 
commander. The supporting commander then, in essence, is responsible for the success 
                                                 
41 Bennet S. Sacolick & Wayne W. Grigsby, “Special Operations/Conventional Forces 
Interdependence: A Critical Role in ‘Prevent, Shape, Win,” Army Magazine, June 2012 Vol.62 No.6, 40.  
42 Sacolick & Grigsby, “Special Operations/Conventional Forces Interdependence,” 42. 
43 Mike Findlay & Gary Luck, Special Operations and Conventional Force Integration. Suffolk: Joint 
Warfighting Center, USJFCOM, 2008, 1-2. 
44 Department of the Army, “Increasing Special Operations Forces (SOF)/Conventional Forces (CF) 
Integration, Interoperability, and Interdependence,” Unified Quest 2012 Issue Paper, May 2012, 7-9. 
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of the supported commander.45  This was institutionalized in doctrine by United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Publication 3-33. This product states that the 
supported/supporting relationship allows SOF the greatest freedom to shape the 
operational environment without being restrained by geographic boundaries.46 It also 
allows the supported commander to set requirements and priority of support, while 
allowing the supporting commander to determine methods and tactics.47   
Jeffrey Ortoli, a Special Forces officer, points out that the supported/supporting 
command relationship is intentionally vague, that it remains focused on access to 
capabilities, not the ownership of forces.48 This challenges traditional military culture, 
where commanders are trained to gain ownership of the forces in their respective areas, 
since they are responsible for what happens there. A cultural shift will be required for the 
Army to adopt the joint concept of supported/supporting command relationships. 
E. SUMMARY 
The future adversaries of the U.S. Army will likely adopt hybrid warfare 
strategies. This will require the U.S. Army to find better ways to integrate CF and SOF 
units in order to better counter these types of threats. The doctrinal approach of focusing 
integration efforts on operations, command relationships, and liaison elements does not 
adequately address how to integrate outside of high-intensity conflict scenarios.  
Operations, or tasks, have been given the least attention in favor of focusing on liaisons. 
This thesis utilizes tasks to explore ways to identify how to integrate CF-SOF in a hybrid 
warfare scenario. We utilize existing concepts carrying the study of CF-SOF integration 
forward. Those concepts are: 1) integrated operations are determined by task, not by unit; 
2) integrated operations require unity of command; 3) integration requires dedicated, 
possibly organic SOF staff support at the JTF level, implying the creation of permanent 
                                                 
45 Findlay & Luck, Special Operations and Conventional Force Integration, 7. 
46 Department of Defense, US SOCOM Publication 3-33.3, CF/SOF: Multi-Service Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration and 
Interoperability, Fort Leavenworth: HQ, Combined Arms Center, 2. 
47 Department of Defense, USSOCOM Pub 3-33.3, 12. 
48 Jeffrey Ortoli, Integration and Interoperability of Special Operations Forces and Conventional 
Forces in Irregular Warfare, Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC Thesis, 2009, 77. 
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CF-SOF exchange elements; and 4) that supported/supporting command-support 
relationship is the most effective. 
To examine how to better integrate CF-SOF in hybrid warfare, we use the design 
structure matrix to identify where interdependencies would exist between CF and SOF 
operations in the same theater. By focusing on what types of operations are 
interdependent, we can determine where CF-SOF integration is most beneficial. This is 





The current body of literature dedicated to CF-SOF integration focuses mainly on 
the use of liaison elements. This can accomplish coordination, but is not sufficient to 
achieve effective integration.  The Army must identify where CF-SOF operations are 
interdependent, and then plan for these operations to be CF-SOF integrated.  A 
systematic way to identify where interdependencies exist is the design structure matrix, 
or DSM.  The DSM provides a method for the mapping of interdependencies between 
tasks, process steps, or members of the organization.  It can reflect three different types of 
relationships between tasks, which will correspond to the level of interdependency 
between units or departments:  
• Independent – this means that separate units do not require interaction 
with each other to accomplish tasks. They can remain separate and operate 
in parallel 
• Sequential – this exists when one unit requires information or resources 
from another to complete its own tasks 
• Reciprocal – the strongest type of interdependence and is characterized by 
a feedback loop. This exists when extensive information exchange is 
required and is best served by placing units inside the same organizational 
boundary49  
The DSM is meant to create a visualization of the organizational structure, and aid 
in design changes if necessary.50 Utilizing the DSM to examine CF-SOF 
interdependency may provide a more precise method of determining where integration is 
required in a campaign plan. 
There are multiple types of DSM’s. In relation to time, they can be static or time-
based. A static DSM represents elements of a system that exist simultaneously, for 
instance groups inside an organization. In time-based DSM’s, the ordering of rows and 
columns indicates the flow of tasks or processes through time. A team-based, or 
organizational, DSM can be utilized for modeling organizational structures, based on 
                                                 
49 Worren, “Hitting the Sweet Spot Between Separation and Integration,” 27-28. 
50 Tyson R. Browning, “Applying the Design Structure Matrix to System Decomposition and 
Integration Problems: A Review and New Directions,” IEE Transactions and Engineering Management 
Vol. 48, No. 3, August 2001, 293. 
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individuals or groups and their interaction. This type of DSM is static. Activity-based 
DSM’s are used for examining processes and the related flow of information, and are 
time-based.51  This thesis utilizes a static, team-based DSM to identify where 
interdependencies exist between CF and SOF across a campaign.  The DSM functions as 
an aid in deciding where and how to integrate CF-SOF for success.  The analysis 
identifies the tasks that require combining CF and SOF for integrated operations during a 
campaign, and what tasks are better suited for keeping CF and SOF elements separate. 
As a campaign plan develops, the tasks for both the Joint Task Force 
(Conventional Forces) and Joint Special Operations Task Force (Special Operations 
Forces) are arrayed on the two axis of the DSM. Planners analyze the intersection of each 
task to determine if interdependency exists, and assign a corresponding value.  These 
values are somewhat arbitrary and indicate if creating an integrated headquarters for the 
task would be beneficial, detrimental, or if integrating CF-SOF has no effect. This thesis 
utilizes the following values throughout: 
• 1 – Integration of CF-SOF headquarters will benefit the operation 
(combining forces is more optimal) 
• 0 – Integration of CF-SOF headquarters will neither benefit/harm the 
operation (no difference) 
• -1 – Integration of CF-SOF headquarters will harm the operation (keeping 
forces separate is more optimal) 
Once these values are assigned to each task intersection, planners are able determine the 
set(s) of tasks in a campaign plan that will be optimized by combining CF and SOF 
elements to complete these tasks as integrated operations.   
Table 1 is an example, with CF tasks (A-D across the top of the matrix), and SOF 
tasks (E-H down the left side of the matrix). Inserted values are for illustration.  
                                                 
51 Browning, “Applying the Design Structure Matrix,” 292-293. 
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 A B C D 
E 0 1 -1 0 
F 0 -1 0 0 
G 1 0 1 0 
H -1 -1 1 0 
Table 1.  Example Design Structure Matrix 
With these values reflected above, planners can make the following planning 
assumptions: 
• That there is no effect on operations by integrating CF-SOF for tasks at 
intersections: A-E, A-F, B-G, C-F, or any intersection under task D. This 
implies that there is no requirement to combine CF-SOF for integrated 
operations here. 
• That there is a positive effect on operations by integrating CF-SOF for 
tasks at intersections: A-G, B-E, C-G, and C-H. This implies that the 
campaign plan is better served by planning for integrated operations to 
accomplish these tasks. 
• That there is a negative effect on operations by integrating CF-SOF for 
tasks at intersections: A-H, B-F, B-H, and C-E.  This implies that 
operations will be hindered by integrated operations.  
The matrix allows for visualization of where integration will have an effect, and the 
nature of that effect. The DSM can help make the decision where to conduct CF-SOF 
integration across a campaign.  
 This thesis does not examine integration as it applies across the spectrum of 
conflict. Using Worren’s chart for the relationship between formal structure and the level 
of work process interdependencies, we examine where effective integration of CF-SOF 
exists in a hybrid warfare scenario.  This allows the focus on a situation where there is an 
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integrated formal structure, and a high level of interdependence. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate 
the application of Worren’s integration approach to the topic of hybrid warfare.  
 
Figure 2.  Formal Structure and Work Process Interdependencies (From Worren, 2012). 
 
Figure 3.  Formal Structure and Level of Interdependence in Hybrid Warfare (Adapted 
from Worren, 2012). 
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We provide two theoretical situations that call for both CF and SOF to operate in 
support of U.S. objectives. These scenarios are purely notional and are only meant to 
provide context for use of the DSM.  These situations arise from areas where there are 
currently internal security issues, namely Chechnya and Northwestern Pakistan.  These 
areas offer cases of state powers currently struggling to maintain control and defeat local 
militant groups.  It is not unreasonable to assume  that, in the next five to ten years, one 
of these situations could escalate to the point where the existing government could 
require some level of foreign assistance or intervention. The fact that each of these areas 
is located inside the borders of a nuclear state adds complexity to each situation.  
 We develop the Chechen and Pakistani scenarios by using the operational design 
framework. Historical context provides the environmental frame; current threat trends 
and events provide the problem frame. We develop likely U.S. campaign objectives to 
arrive at the solution frame. Once the solution frame is determined, campaign tasks are 
assigned to a notional JTF and JSOTF. These tasks will then populate the design structure 
matrix for each scenario. Upon creation of the DSM and establishment of the task 
interdependencies, we determine the integration mechanisms that could provide the best 
fit.  
A.  LIMITATIONS 
The major limitation of using a static DSM is that it only provides a snapshot of 
the expected tasks that will be completed in the course of operations. The DSM no longer 
applies once operations begin and the situation changes.  Once new set of tasks is 
identified, the DSM must be rebuilt and analyzed. This should not detract from the value 
of the DSM to planners, as it still provides a method to analyze where CF-SOF 
interdependencies exist, and where there is value in conducting integrated operations 
across a campaign. 
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IV. CHECHNYA CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we examine historical and current conditions that make Chechnya 
an excellent example of a hybrid warfare scenario. The first section consists of a brief 
historical context of Chechnya with a more in-depth look at the First and Second 
Chechen Wars. In the next section, we describe the current conditions, to include the 
current state of the insurgency, in the Republic of Chechnya. Finally, we examine lessons 
learned and utilize these to develop tasks for the notional JTF and JSOTF that would be 
required to develop an operational campaign plan for a Chechnya-like scenario and be 
required to determine where and how to conduct CF-SOF integrated operations inside 
that campaign. The DSM analysis in Chapter Six will be used to evaluate CF and SOF 
tasks in order to identify where task interdependencies exist, and where the commander 
can best combine CF-SOF for integrated operations and best accomplish those tasks. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 For over two centuries, local inhabitants and the Russian government have been 
in competition for control of the North Caucasus region that includes Chechnya. More 
recently, in 1934, the Russian government merged Chechnya and its neighboring 
province of Ingush to form an autonomous republic under Russian control. This republic 
was then abolished in 1944 because the Russian government alleged that Chechen and 
Ingush citizens were assisting the German military. Russia deported hundreds of 
thousands of Chechens and Ingush to Central Asia and Siberia due to these allegations. It 
is estimated that there were over 200,000 Chechen deaths that resulted from the 
deportation and exile under these harsh conditions.52  In 1957, Nikita Khrushchev, the 
First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, allowed the Chechen and 
Ingush people to return to their homelands. The deportation and exile of the Chechen 
people, for almost 13 years, is one of the most influential events to define their cultural 
                                                 
52 Tim Youngs, The Conflict in Chechnya, Research Paper, London: House of Commons Library, 
2000, 8. 
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narrative. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former 
Soviet military officer, declared Chechen independence from Russia.  
In 1994, the Russian government sent approximately 35,000 soldiers to regain 
control of the Chechen Republic. This event began the First Chechen War. After an 
unsuccessful military campaign, the Russian government signed a peace agreement with 
the Chechen rebels in 1996. This accord granted Chechnya substantially more autonomy 
but not independence.53  As a result of terrorist attacks in Dagestan and Russia in 1999, 
the Russian government sent the military back to Chechnya to subdue the rebel factions. 
The Russian military proved to be significantly more effective during the Second 
Chechen War, lasting from August 1999 to May 2000. Since that time, Russia has 
maintained a military presence in the region to support the Pro-Russian Chechen 
government and conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Chechen rebels. 
Chechen insurgent groups still conduct regular attacks on Russian and Chechen 
government forces. The most recent incident reported was a simultaneous three-person 
suicide bomb attack that killed six people in Grozny in August 2011.54  The following 
section contains a more detailed look at the First and Second Chechen Wars. 
C. THE FIRST CHECHEN WAR 
The First Chechen War is an excellent example of a Chechen force, in both its 
organization and hybrid tactics, confronting a larger conventional military element. In 
December 1994, after three years of independence, Russian forces entered Chechnya to 
regain control of its lost republic.55  Although Russia was still adjusting to a post-Soviet 
era, their government and military leaders were confident that they could quickly defeat 
the Chechen rebels. It soon became apparent that the Russian military, comprised of 
35,000 soldiers—the majority conscripts—and trained on Cold War doctrine was not 
prepared for a hybrid threat actor and environment. On New Year’s Eve 1994, Russian 
forces attempted to seize Grozny by conducting an unsupported armored column advance 
                                                 
53 British Broadcasting Company News, Regions and territories: Chechnya, London: BBC News at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/2565049.stm (accessed on September 15, 2012). 
54 BBC News, Regions and territories: Chechnya. 
55 Youngs, The Conflict in Chechnya, 10. 
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on the city. The Chechen rebels, consisting of small, decentralized elements of fifteen to 
twenty personnel and working in three- or four-person teams, conducted a series of anti-
armor ambushes against the Russians.56  The Russian forces took devastating causalities 
in this first major battle of the war. The 131st “Maikop” armored brigade suffered 
heavily. They reportedly lost 20 of 26 tanks and 102 of 120 armored personnel carriers. It 
is believed that approximately 2,000 Russian soldiers were killed during this first 
engagement.57  According to Arquilla and Karasik, the Chechen rebels were so 
successful against the Russian military largely on account of their decentralized nature.  
“Instead of a centralized command and control, the Chechens gave great latitude for 
action to their dispersed but highly interconnected bands, which fought in a nonlinear 
fashion, enabling them, repeatedly, to ‘swarm’ advancing Russian columns from all 
directions.”58  The Chechen ability to swarm highlights their ability to converge on 
Russian forces, conduct an attack, and then return to their smaller groups. In addition to 
their organizational structure, Chechen forces were highly effective against the Russian 
military because of their access to modern weaponry and their ability to move freely 
about the battlefield.   
After the New Year’s Eve battle, the Russian forces attempted to surround 
Grozny and systematically clear the city of the Chechen rebels. This strategy involved 
aerial and artillery barrages inside the city prior to Russian infantry and Special Forces 
attempts to secure the area using standard, conventional practices.59  Simultaneously, the 
Chechen rebel groups infiltrated the city by blending in with the population and 
exploiting gaps in the Russian perimeter.  The regular rotation of Chechen soldiers in and 
out of Grozny allowed their forces to refit and share information that they learned while 
                                                 
56 John Arquilla & Theodore Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism, 1999, 210. 
57 Youngs, The Conflict in Chechnya, 10. 
58 Arquilla & Karasik, “Chechnya: A Glimpse of Future Conflict?” 208. 
59 Youngs, The Conflict in Chechnya, 10. 
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fighting inside the city.60  This campaign also highlighted several shortfalls for the 
Russian military’s force structure that hindered their tactical capabilities. First, they did 
not have a unified command structure to synchronize the actions of units from three 
governmental departments: the Defense Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and the Security 
Ministry. Additionally, the Russian force consisted primarily of conscript soldiers, which 
impacted combat readiness levels and soldier discipline. Finally, poor communication 
systems limited the tactical units’ ability to coordinate with each other. Poor 
communications, coupled with poor unit discipline, resulted in numerous fratricide 
incidents. With mounting casualty numbers, popular support for the war in Chechnya 
rapidly decreased.61  In April 1996, the Chechen President, Dzhokhar Dudayev, was 
killed by a Russian air strike, opening the door for negotiations. In June 1996, President 
Yeltsin and Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, Dudayev’s successor, signed a peace accord to 
officially end the war after almost 18 months of fighting. 
D. THE SECOND CHECHEN WAR 
 In the years between the two Chechen wars, the Russian military spent a 
significant amount of time analyzing the lessons learned from the first conflict. As a 
result, they made several significant improvements for combating unconventional threats, 
such as training for mountain warfare and improving unit coordination measures. 
However, one area that the Russian military did not address was urban warfare. Due to 
the significant number of casualties in the first war, Russian military planners were 
convinced that it was best to avoid urban warfare altogether.62  In the meantime, Chechen 
rebels also focused on training for an eventual second war with Russia. They established 
several training centers for tactics and marksmanship; heavy weapons; diversionary and 
                                                 
60 “Arquilla and Karasik state: ‘Chechen small-unit cohesion during the war benefited greatly from the 
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terrorist tactics; and psychological and ideological warfare.63  In addition to their training 
efforts, the Chechens prepared defensive positions, excavating underground passages 
between buildings in Grozny. Like the First Chechen War, these defensive positions 
allowed the Chechen rebels to move freely through Grozny and ambush Russian armored 
columns. 
 During the second war, the Russian military employed several new strategies that 
significantly increased effectiveness. First, Russia deployed approximately 95,000 
soldiers under one unified commander. Second, the Russian’s adopted a new strategy in 
an effort to avoid significant casualties in urban areas. Russian “Storm” detachments, 
consisting of three to five personnel with specialized training and equipment, would 
conduct reconnaissance forward of the main body to identify Chechen positions, 
constituting the formation and tailoring of special operations forces used in direct support 
of conventional forces. After the enemy positions were identified, artillery and aviation 
attacks were focused on those areas before “clearing forces” moved into the area.64  
Marginally effective, these tactics caused a significant number of civilian casualties and 
damage to the local infrastructure. Their final, and perhaps most important new strategy 
involved their information management programs. During the Second Chechen War, the 
Russian government severely restricted the media’s access to the battlefield. This allowed 
the Russian military to use extremely harsh tactics with minimal objections from the 
international community. Russian popular support of the Second Chechen War remained 
relatively high.   
Despite shifting their strategy, the Russian military made several significant 
mistakes. First, the Russian military’s plan for seizing Grozny involved developing a 
“spider web” of the city so that they could clear each section sequentially. However, the 
Russians did not realize that the Chechen rebels were fighting a different kind of war.65  
                                                 
63 Oliker, Russia’s Chechen Wars, 39-40. 
64 Ibid, 45-46. 
65 “According to Oliker: ‘Whatever spiderweb had been planned, actual fighting was positional and 
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The Russians remained focused on a conventional, territory-based form of warfare. The 
Chechen rebels, on the other hand, were content to give ground to the Russians while 
inflicting as much damage on their military forces as possible. An important factor in 
Russia’s inability to decisively defeat the Chechen rebels again was their refusal to 
prepare for urban combat. The Russian focus on mountain warfare prior to the Second 
Chechen War ensured that the military had to re-learn the lessons of urban warfare during 
combat. 
E. CURRENT CONDITIONS IN CHECHNYA 
 This section, describes the current political, social and military conditions in the 
Republic of Chechnya. In March 2007, President Vladimir Putin nominated Ramzan 
Kadyrov to serve as the President of Chechnya. Ramzan Kadyrov’s father, Akhmad 
Kadyrov, was a former Chechen President killed in a bombing in Grozny in 2004.66  
Since his appointment, Ramzan Kadyrov has consolidated much of the power in the 
executive branch of the government, regulated media outlets, and engaged in an 
aggressive, lethal campaign to target the insurgents.67  Under his tenure, Chechnya has 
received a significant amount of aid from the Russian government for reconstruction 
efforts. In addition, Kadyrov has made a deliberate effort to resurrect Chechen cultural 
traditions, such as the Chechen language, which had been lost during the Soviet rule.68  
However, rampant corruption at the national and local levels has damaged Kadyrov’s and 
the government’s legitimacy. Local government officials are reported to regularly extort 
the local population for kickbacks, typically 50 percent, on government reconstruction 
efforts.69  Despite the corruption, there has been a significant amount of reconstruction 
since the last Chechen war. Kaydrov has attempted to sell the message that: “Kadyrov 
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saves Chechen culture. Chechnya under Kadyrov, has actually achieved 
independence.”70 
 The Russian military has maintained a regular presence in Chechnya since the end 
of the Second Chechen War, conducting counterinsurgency operations. In 2012, Shaefer 
stated that the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, with 15,000 personnel, possessed the 
primary responsibility for operations in the Caucasus region. In addition, two separate 
mountain brigades, with specialized anti-terrorism training, with approximately 4,500 
soldiers remain in the region.71  The Russian government also deploys police officers on 
six-month rotations to the North Caucasus region. However, the exact numbers and 
locations are unknown.72  Russian forces do not regularly conduct combined operations 
with local Chechen security forces. The Russians claim that many of the local police 
members either actively or passively support the Chechen insurgents. 
 Chechnya was historically a significant exporter of oil and natural gas to Russia 
and the North Caucasus region. In addition, the oil pipeline from Azerbaijan passes 
through Grozny on its way to the Black Sea.73  The oil infrastructure in Chechnya was 
almost completely wiped out during the First Chechen War and still has yet to fully 
recover. Chechnya does not have a significant agricultural market, and most livestock has 
either died or been killed by Russian troops.74  Since the end of the Second Chechen 
War, the Russian government has provided a great deal of financial support to the 
Chechen government to support reconstruction efforts. The unemployment rate is 
approximately 50 percent, despite the influx of jobs from reconstruction efforts. In 2010, 
Russian subsidies accounted for almost 90 percent of Chechnya’s annual budget.75  
Shaefer states: “Once Kadyrov is no longer able to artificially keep the economy afloat 
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and pay salaries, the situation will deteriorate and even more men will join the 
insurgency—because the emirate will always be able to pay them.”76 
 The two most important factors that affect Chechen social interactions are kin 
(family) relationships and religion. According to Arquilla and Karasik: “An important 
building-block of Chechen success was the structure of Chechen society, which consists 
of tribal/clan formations divided between lowland inhabitants and the mountaineers—
who frequently feud.”77  Chechen society is divided into village, tribal, and clan 
relationships. At the lowest level, ne’ke or gar divide individuals into sub-clan groups in 
villages. A taip group consists of several villages, with approximately 400 to 600 people. 
A council of elders governs each taip, regulating economic interests and establishing 
rules for the collective villages. A tukhum, or tribe, consists of several taip’s and is 
usually separated between the mountain and lowland inhabitants.78  Religion has become 
the second most influential factor in Chechen society. Islam has historically been the 
most prevalent religion in the area, and has seen resurgence after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Most Chechens are Sunni Muslim and practice either Shafi’I or Sufi Islam, both 
of which are moderate forms of the religion that emphasize tolerance, spirituality, and 
education.79 
 Much of the basic infrastructure in Chechnya was destroyed during the First and 
Second Chechen Wars. The Chechen oil reserves and the oil pipelines are arguably one 
of the reasons Russia has fought so hard to retain Chechnya as a federal republic. The 
Chechen oil industry produces about two million barrels of oil annually, with those 
revenues going directly to the Russian federal offices.80   Kodyrov, with the aid of 
Russian funding, has made a substantial effort to rebuild much of the country’s 
infrastructure in recent years. These efforts have included: government buildings, 
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apartments, schools, hospitals, parks, industrial buildings, and cultural centers.81  
Although government corruption and poor quality construction have diminished some of 
Kadyrov’s efforts, conditions have generally improved in the last several years. 
 Information management has played a key role in both Russia’s and Kadyrov’s 
pro-Russian government to combat the Chechen insurgency. Prior to the 2nd Chechen 
War, Vladimir Putin depicted the Chechen insurgency as an Islamic terrorist movement, 
drawing parallels to the United States’ Global War on Terror. Throughout the war, Russia 
maintained tight control over the media’s access to the conflict. As a result, Russian 
public support remained high throughout the second campaign.82  Today, Kadyrov’s 
government maintains strict control of media outlets in Chechnya. There are currently 
two government-run television and radio stations and three newspapers, two of which are 
run by the government. Reporters Without Borders named President Kadyrov one of the 
“Predators of Press Freedom.”83  According to Schaefer, Kadyrov uses his control of 
media outlets to promote his information campaign to counter the insurgency. Kadyrov 
states: “Chechnya has now been rebuilt, and it is better than ever. The separatists and the 
Islamists wanted Chechen independence, but they had no idea what to do with it when 
they had it and instead of a successful modern state, they created a mafia racket.”84 
F. CHECHEN INSURGENCY 
In late 2007, Dokka Umarov, the president of the unofficial secessionist 
government of Chechnya, proclaimed the end of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria 
(ChRI) and established the Caucasus Emirate (CE). Following this event, the Chechen 
insurgency abandoned its organizational identity of a secular democratic movement and 
adopted a more ideological one: reactionary traditionalism in the form of conservative 
Islam.85  The insurgency now incorporates the religious structure of an emirate into the 
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already existing clan structures.86  The CE’s strategic goal is to expel Russian forces 
from the North Caucasus region and establish a shari’a-based government. Although 
there are some ideological differences within the CE, they maintain their alliances by 
focusing on their common enemies. The CE’s near-term goals are to garner popular 
support by highlighting the current Chechen government’s illegitimacy, corruption, and 
its inability to provide essential services to Chechen citizens.87  At the tactical level, the 
insurgency has focused its attacks on Russian and Chechen security forces. A focus on 
rural-based operations represents one significant change in the insurgent’s tactics.88  The 
rural guerrilla force appears to be disciplined, with well-trained platoon-sized elements 
and access to sophisticated weapons technology. In addition to the guerilla force, they 
maintain a sizeable auxiliary that is estimated at approximately 15,000 individuals.89  It 
appears that the CE is attempting to maintain their relevancy by conducting small-scale 
attacks on government forces, while they recruit, train, and grow their guerrilla force. 
 In the region’s mountainous rural areas, Chechen tactical formations closely 
resemble infantry platoon formations, with standardized uniforms and weapon systems. 
Simultaneously, they maintain the ability to de-aggregate into smaller groups to achieve a 
tactical advantage over their Russian counterparts in an urban environment.   The 
Chechen anti-armor and sniper teams that operated in Grozny during both wars are 
excellent examples of the rebels’ ability to conduct decentralized operations. Despite 
their independent nature, with the use of communications systems these small teams were 
able to converge and conduct decisive attacks on enemy forces. An additional challenge 
that the hybrid Chechen rebels pose is their ability to blend in with the local populace. As 
we have seen in the Russo-Chechen wars, the Chechen ability to transition from non-
combatant to insurgent presented significant challenges to the Russian military forces. 
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Purely to illustrate the methodology, we make the assumption that the Russian 
and Chechen governments are unable to deal with the growing insurgency in the 
Republic of Chechnya. This leads to a notional crisis that requires their governments to 
request U.S. military assistance.  We utilize the design structure matrix (DSM) in Chapter 
Six to examine CF- SOF integration against such threats for this scenario.  This is 
accomplished by developing the tasks required of both the JTF and JSOTF to counter 
emerging hybrid warfare threats in Chechnya.  Additionally, the DSM can show where 
integration of the different forces would be beneficial, and where it would be detrimental. 
This serves as a demonstration of how campaign planners and senior commanders can 
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V. PAKISTAN CASE STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter examines current trends in Pakistan that demonstrate a hybrid 
warfare environment. Understanding what dynamics in Pakistan constitute a new kind of 
threat demonstrates the necessity to look at CF-SOF integration from a fresh perspective.  
This chapter examines the historical background behind the violent conflict in Kashmir 
between Pakistan and India; explaining what factors lead Pakistan to assume a proxy 
strategy there against India, and how that proxy strategy has caused great risk to the 
internal stability of Pakistan itself. Again, purely for illustration of the methodology, we 
create a situation that leads to the commitment of U.S. forces to assist Pakistan in its 
counterinsurgency efforts.  
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Pakistan currently faces serious threats to internal security from Islamic militant 
groups. The irony is that these groups have enjoyed both overt and covert Pakistani 
support for almost thirty years. Pakistan initially formed and supported these groups to 
fight a proxy war against India in Jammu and Kashmir, and now is losing control of these 
proxies and is now conducting a prolonged counterinsurgency fight inside its own 
borders. 
Examining the history of violence in Jammu and Kashmir demonstrates why 
Pakistan chose to adopt a proxy strategy against its traditionally stronger enemy in India.  
The contested territory of Jammu and Kashmir, along the India-Pakistan border, has seen 
many decades of conflict.  Pakistan has argued that this region should be part of its nation 
due to the large Muslim population, and it has waged various wars since 1947 to try and 
acquire the province.  The first Muslim separatist groups in Jammu and Kashmir were 
organized in the 1920s, while the area was still part of British India.   Violent conflict 
with these groups began in the late 1980’s with an attack by the Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front (JKLF) on the Kashmiri State Legislative Assembly in Srinagar. The 
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violence can be attributed to two factors, India’s poor management of policy in Kashmir, 
and Pakistan’s start of a proxy campaign.   
Basing their strategy on the successful use of irregular Muslim fighters in 
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, Pakistan decided to support existing Kashmiri 
militant organizations and form many more.  This was intended to keep a stream of 
irregular fighters, based in Pakistan, operating against India inside Kashmir.  This 
strategy hoped to keep bleeding Indian manpower and resources while preventing the 
outbreak of a large-scale war between the two nuclear powers. Examining the history of 
violence in Jammu and Kashmir suggests that Pakistan’s strategy will not result in 
Jammu and Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan, but will only continue to force India to 
commit resources to the region. 
 So far unsuccessful in gaining control of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan now faces 
a serious threat from the militant organizations that it created and sponsored to act as 
insurgents against India.  These militant groups gained global attention when they began 
carrying out attacks outside Kashmir, and were labeled international terrorist 
organizations by the United States in the early phases of the Global War on Terror. This 
caused Pakistan to adopt two simultaneous approaches to its proxies.  The Pakistani 
government has publically banned many militant organizations with violent groups like 
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) at the top of the list, while the 
Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) secretly lends support. 90 The Pakistani 
government’s public support of American policies, however, has resulted in Pakistan now 
being targeted as well.  The evolution of these Pakistani-based groups suggests that they 
have begun to assert more control over the rural, loosely governed regions of Pakistan 
where they have historically been based.  Traditionally managed by Pakistan’s Intra-
Services Intelligence (ISI), many of the violent groups are now asserting their 
independence and finding alternate sources of support.  The groups are now controlling 
their local areas, while resisting Pakistan’s attempts to establish Islamabad’s authority.  
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This bourgeoning insurgency poses a serious danger to the nuclear state of Pakistan. If 
the ISI has lost control of the militant groups that it helped create, Pakistan may suffer a 
crisis that will have repercussions across central Asia. 
C. THE KASHMIR PROBLEM 
Contention over Kashmir began with the separation of India and Pakistan from 
the former British Empire following World War II.  Kashmir acceded into the Indian 
Union in 1947.  The accession was not accepted by Pakistan, who felt that the large 
number of Muslims inside the state warranted Kashmir becoming part of Pakistan.91  
Both India and Pakistan had interests in Kashmir, which was the largest princely state 
under the British system prior to 1947.  Kashmir was considered strategically important 
because of its location along the borders of the USSR, China, and Afghanistan.  Both 
India and Pakistan saw possession of Kashmir as essential for establishing defendable 
borders.92   
Kashmiris occupy a place between cultures, and have always felt a gap between 
themselves and their rulers.  The Hindu group known as the Dogras took control of 
Kashmir under the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846.  Kashmir became a state with a Muslim 
majority population, ruled by a Hindu minority.  The Dogras’ rule of Kashmir was 
characterized by discrimination against Kashmiris in general, especially Muslims.  
Kashmiris were not given the right to keep weapons, while Muslims were heavily taxed, 
denied access to education, and excluded from state services.  Muslims quickly 
developed a distrust of their Hindu Dogra rulers.93    
Kashmir saw the rise of Muslim separatist groups in the 1940s. In 1945, the group 
Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir) published a manifesto that committed Kashmiri Muslims 
to the struggle for a separate homeland and the formation of Pakistan.94  Despite the 
efforts of Kashmiri Muslims and Pakistan, Kashmir still chose to join the Indian Union in 
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1947, keeping conditions for the average Kashmiri largely unchanged after India’s 
independence.   
 Tension remained in Kashmir, with Pakistan and India fighting conventional 
battles over the territory, but the local independence movement was largely non-violent 
until the late 1980s.   Allegations of fraudulent State Legislative Assembly elections in 
1987 helped fuel resentment among many young Kashmiri Muslims, and would 
eventually begin the era of terrorism in Kashmir.  In February 1988, militants founded the 
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).  On July 31, 1988 militants bombed the 
Central Telegraph Office and Srinagar Club in the city of Srinagar, marking the 
beginning of the Muslim terror campaign in Kashmir.95    
D. PAKISTAN ADOPTS A PROXY 
Pakistan saw the opportunity to adopt a new strategy designed to gain control of 
Kashmir. The new approach would allow Pakistan to inflict pain on India, without risking 
defeat at the hands of their conventionally superior neighbor.  Using the defeat of the 
USSR in Afghanistan by jihadi militants as a model for Kashmir, Pakistan decided to 
adopt a proxy war strategy against India. Pakistan, through its intelligence service, the 
Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), started to assist existing Muslim militant 
groups, or tanzeems, as well as form new ones.  Pakistan believed that more groups 
would aid with operational security and encouraged the split of existing groups.  India 
believes the ISI may have created and sponsored as many as 150 organizations from 
1980-1999.96 Internally, the ISI saw sponsoring militant groups as a way to temper 
Pakistan’s pro-Iranian Shia populace.97 
Many Pakistani militant organizations adhere to the Deobandi belief system of 
Islam, one of the most stringent of the many variations of Islamic belief systems.   This 
system is very close the better-known Wahabism of Saudi Arabia, that Al Qaeda and 
other terrorist organizations follow.  This Islamic belief system dates back to India in 
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1867.  Deobandis initially founded their own madrassas to counter European influence in 
education and still believe in a strict adherence to Islamic Law.  Deobandis are 
considered the most conservative and anti-western Sunni sect in Pakistan.98  Many 
Deobandi groups believe that Kashmir is less a territorial dispute between India and 
Pakistan, and more a war between the ideologies of Islam and that of all non-believers.99  
This ideological shift, however, brought groups farther away from the native Kashmiris 
for whom they claimed to be fighting.  This changed the problem from Indian occupation 
of Kashmir to the broader issue of non-Muslims occupying Islamic lands.  It expanded 
the enemy from India to all non-believers. The context shifted as well, from the Kashmiri 
independence movement, to that of Pakistan’s larger proxy war aimed at hurting India 
slowly, now mixed with Al Qaeda’s larger war against the West.100 
E. THE CONFLICT EXPANDS OUTSIDE KASHMIR 
Groups closely linked to the ISI, like Laskhar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) and Jaish e 
Muhammad (JeM), initially were primarily involved with Pakistan’s proxy war against 
India inside Kashmir. These groups entered the global arena at the end of 2001 when they 
participated in the attack on the Indian Parliament buildings in New Delhi.  Five terrorists 
attacked the Parliament buildings with firearms and explosives, killing nine security 
guards and one civilian.101  This attack brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war in 
Kashmir, with one million troops being deployed to the border between India and 
Pakistan for six months. The attack on the Indian Parliament changed international 
perceptions about the conflict in Kashmir from a fight for popular self-determination to 
an issue of international terrorism.102  The attack resulted in U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell adding LeT and JeM to the list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, bringing them 
onto radars in America and worldwide.   Pakistani President Musharraf outlawed the 
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groups formally in January 2002 and placed the JeM leader Masood Azhar under house 
arrest for twelve months.103  The detention of Azhar by Pakistan had less to do with 
JeM’s involvement in the New Delhi attacks, and more to do with Azhar’s direct 
involvement in the January 2002 murder of the Wall Street Journal correspondent Daniel 
Pearl in Pakistan.104  Following the brutal murder of a U.S. citizen, Pakistan could not 
afford to not take this demonstrative action. 
Since most militant groups claiming to fight for Kashmiri independence operate 
out of Pakistan, and are significantly controlled by the ISI, they are affected more by 
what happens in Pakistan than in Kashmir.  Sponsorship by Pakistan, and the fact that 
most recruits come from outside Kashmir, has caused many groups to lose their 
indigenous character and has alienated many Kashmiris.  The Kashmiris are generally 
more tied to the Sufi traditions of Islam than the fundamentalist Deobandi belief system. 
This has caused many native Kashmiris to reject the puritanical religious philosophy of 
many militant groups.  Kashmiris have also withdrawn their support for jihadi groups due 
to their brutality, like the beheading of enemies and the mutilating of their bodies.105   
As a result of this loss of support, Pakistani and other non-Kashmiri mercenaries 
now make up most of the militant groups fighting in Kashmir.106 For example, a 
Pakistani named Faizal Shahzad, who attempted to carry out a car-bomb attack in New 
York’s Times Square in 2010, testified that he learned bomb making techniques in 
Pakistan where he developed ties to JeM and LeT.107  Also, two of the suicide bombers 
involved in the July 2005 attacks on London, Shezad Tanweer and Siddique Khan, had 
active ties to groups in Pakistan.  The reach of their recruiting efforts is well 
demonstrated by the recent arrest of five young Americans who were captured in the 
Sargodha district of Punjab who stated they were trying to join either JeM or LeT.108  
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This demonstrates that while groups similar to LeT and JeM are losing popular support 
inside Kashmir, they are still actively sending Pakistani men to conduct terrorist attacks 
outside the Subcontinent.  
The support base for militant groups comes mainly from the fundamentalist 
Muslim community in Pakistan. Organizations conduct regular fundraisers by visiting 
mosques and Islamic schools.  At these fundraisers groups will sell the hides of sacrificed 
animals.   Two financial organizations that are known to fund terrorist operations are the 
Al Rashid Trust and Al Akhtar Trust.109  Both of these funds were frozen by the United 
States government in October 2001 for their shared ties to Al Qaeda.  
A large amount of funding for groups like LeT and JeM comes from the Pakistani 
ISI.  It is believed that the ISI sends up to Rs 200 crore or $45 million USD annually into 
Kashmir in support of jihadi groups. For example, JeM receives approximately 25% 
directly from the ISI and the other 40% is filtered from the ISI through various Islamic 
groups.110   
After the banning of certain groups by Pakistan and the freezing of their funds by 
the United States in 2002, militant leaders quickly adapted and continued to acquire 
resources.  The Al Rahmat Trust, founded in 2001, is officially listed as an educational 
and religious charity.  The Al Rahmat Trust claims to fund approximately 850 homes of 
jihadi martyrs and families of jihadis currently imprisoned in India and other countries.  
The Trust carries out open fund raising through legitimate channels and seeks donations 
for the building of mosques in Pakistan.  The Trust’s online magazine Al Qalam claims 
that it has built thirteen mosques and has another twenty-four under construction.  The Al 
Rahmat Trust solicits donations to support the households of martyrs and mujahedeen 
fighters.  The U.S. Treasury Department denounced the Trust in November 2010 for 
being a suspected terrorist front organization.  However, during an interview with the 
Karachi-based Express Tribune in the summer of 2011, a militant group leader named 
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Maulana Asfaq Ahmed stated that the Al Rahmat Trust was actively fundraising in the 
Punjab and Khyber-Paktunkhwa provinces of Pakistan.111   
The funding from the Al Rahmat Trust has allowed groups to expand their 
strategy to providing social services for the local population, and filling a crisis relief role 
that the local government often cannot fill itself.  The large earthquake in 2005 in Azad 
Kashmir (Pakistani-controlled Kashmir) killed more than 55,000 and created a homeless 
population of over two million. Initially, the Pakistani Army was concerned that Indian 
forces would use the earthquake as an opportunity to cross the Line of Control to gain 
territory, and deployed the majority of Pakistan’s forces to strategic positions along the 
Line of Control’s heights.  JeM, for example, used its post-Pakistan ban alias Khuddum-
al-Islam, under the sponsorship of the Al Rahmat Trust, and deployed thousands of 
volunteers to aid in recovery efforts, even supplying locals with medical care. Providing 
this care caused many locals to see the militants as their saviors after the earthquake 
crisis.112  This action shows an evolution inside militant organizations like JeM, and 
could point towards a shift in their strategy toward the local population.  Continuing to 
provide essential services could win more sustained support from the Kashmiri populace.  
This increased support will hamper Pakistan’s ability to regain control of areas where 
militants have asserted themselves.  
F. PAKISTAN’S PROXY STRATEGY 
It is clear that Pakistan has been deeply involved with militant organizations as 
part of its proxy war against India in Kashmir.  Using jihadi groups, it has developed the 
organizations into operational arms of its ISI.  The groups have always positioned their 
headquarters inside Pakistan’s borders.113 Pakistan has waged the low-intensity campaign 
in Kashmir under its nuclear umbrella, and has utilized the militant groups it sponsors 
very effectively.  During the Kashmir confrontation in 2002 for example, Pakistan 
directed militant groups to dominate the strategic areas along the southern border belts of 
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Kashmir.  Pakistan supplied these groups with night vision devices, sniper rifles, mortars, 
grenade launchers, and sophisticated communications gear.  They instructed the irregular 
fighters to target Indian lines of communications and the Indian Army’s rear areas.114 
Being able to leverage this kind of control over the irregular fighters provides Pakistan 
with another operational asset when facing the numerically superior forces of India. This 
gives Pakistan a good reason to maintain relations with the militant groups inside its 
borders.  The other side of this practice, however is that the ISI has increased the 
capabilities of the militant groups, making it easier for them to adopt a hybrid warfare 
model of operations. 
The beginning of the Global War on Terror in 2001 caused Pakistan to adopt a 
dual approach in its support to the jihadi groups in Kashmir.  The Pakistani government 
moved to publically separate itself from many groups like LeT and JeM, adding them to 
its list of banned organizations.  After the 9/11 attacks in America, and following the 
attack on the Indian Parliament, the ISI was forced to focus on protecting its jihadi 
groups.  The ISI developed a code of conduct for the groups receiving sponsorship, 
directing them to avoid contact with the media, and to stop making inflammatory 
statements against the West, especially the United States.  The ISI also directed groups to 
take down their signs on offices in Islamabad and to stop holding rallies in Pakistan.  The 
ISI also attempted to have groups change their organizational names to less military-
sounding ones to make it easier for ISI to claim it was supporting political 
organizations.115  This demonstrates the ISI feels that it is necessary to keep their proxies 
protected for future utilization.  This may not match the Pakistani government’s long-
term goals for its place in the region and may already be causing serious internal 
problems. 
A few violent groups have tried to make Pakistan’s support for American efforts 
to fight terrorism more costly. President Musharraf gave his reasons for assisting the 
American efforts in Afghanistan against the Taliban by saying that it would secure 
Pakistan’s strategic assets, safeguard the cause in Kashmir, prevent Pakistan from being 
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declared a terrorist state, and prevent an anti-Pakistani government from coming to power 
in Kabul.116  This has caused militant groups to actively resist U.S. interests in Pakistan, 
and to target high-level government members who are viewed as pro-American.117  One 
group, Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) has even gone so far as to target President Musharraf 
himself.  In December 2003, JeM tried to assassinate Musharraf near Rawalpindi, using 
information taken from a JeM sympathizer inside the local police force. JeM again 
attempted to assassinate Musharraf in January 2004.  Even after these attempted attacks, 
JeM and its support group the Al Rahmat Trust are able to publish inside Pakistan with 
Audit Bureau of Circulation certifications from the Pakistani Ministry of Information and 
Broadcasting.118  This willingness to attack high-level officials demonstrates future 
problems for Pakistan posed by the militant groups that it helped create.  
G. TROUBLE INSIDE PAKISTAN  
 Supporting militant jihadi groups in Pakistan to fight India in Kashmir has proven 
effective only to the extent that India has tied up large amounts of people and resources 
inside Kashmir.  Pakistan’s efforts to take Kashmir under Pakistani control however have 
not been successful.  Now Pakistan faces danger from the groups it has formed and 
supported in its fight against India.  While still fighting India in Kashmir, these groups 
are now also pursuing the goal of turning Pakistan into a more fundamentalist Islamic 
state.  This new objective poses a serious threat to Pakistan itself, as the jihadi groups 
now resemble a beast that Pakistan can no longer control.119   
 These militant groups are no longer merely an operational arm of Pakistani 
policy, they have become more independent are and able to pursue their own goals, 
despite any objections from the ISI or Pakistani government.  These actions have 
included attacks on Pakistani forces and government officials, as well as attacks in India 
that threaten the unstable peace between the two nuclear powers.  This loss of control of 
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the many militant groups that Pakistan has sponsored poses critical threats to both 
internal and external security interests.120   
 Internally, groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban (aka Pakistani Taliban), which the 
government of Pakistan (the ISI) once supported in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, 
now assert control over large tracts of Pakistani territory. Once in control of an area, the 
groups resist the central government, enforce strict Islamic law, and abet militants 
fighting against NATO inside Afghanistan.121  This harms Pakistan internationally, as 
they are unable to control militants working against NATO interests in Afghanistan.  
Internally, it demonstrates an irony that groups supported by the ISI to wage an 
insurgency against the USSR in Afghanistan are now beginning to wage another one 
against Pakistan itself.  
 The militant organizations supported by Pakistan now have a history dating back 
to the 1980s. There are men that have no experience outside of fighting their jihad.  Even 
if Kashmir’s conflict is resolved, this population of fighters has no aspirations beyond 
holy war.  Since Pakistan is home to many of these groups, it became their new 
battlefield. The militant’s long-standing relationship with the criminal elements of 
Pakistan increases the threat they currently pose. The jihadis have long utilized criminals 
to help smuggle supplies and serve as part-time mercenary fighters. Many groups are now 
deeply intermingled with criminal organizations inside Pakistan.  This creates problems 
for Pakistan and the ISI since they will be able to exert less control over fighters simply 
looking for profit as opposed to those who may be more sympathetic to ideological or 
state goals.122   This new support system will also allow militant groups to rely less on 
the ISI, creating less leverage that Pakistan may have in controlling these groups’ actions.  
 More troubling is the fact that Pakistan, so far, has been unable to regain control 
of the areas that militants have claimed for themselves. These areas are confined to the 
parts of Pakistan known as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). As their names suggest, central government control 
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and an actual administrative or institutional presence by Pakistan has historically been 
lacking in these areas.  Groups naturally took up residence in these rural areas to set up 
training camps, and support networks.  The militant groups found areas in the FATA and 
NWFP where they could more easily compete with the Pakistani government for control 
over the population.  While the Pakistani government has been relatively successful in 
using the ISI to support insurgencies since the 1980s, it has proven unsuccessful in 
combating the insurgencies beginning to develop inside its own borders.  Pakistan has 
lost up 1,500 of the 100,000 soldiers that it has deployed to the FATA and NWFP. While 
facing constant attack by militant groups in these areas, they are also seeing soldiers 
become less than willing to fight their fellow tribesmen.123 
 Unable to stabilize the NWFP and FATA with large conventional formations, the 
Pakistani government brokered a peace deal with the tribal groups in September 2006.  
This deal included the stipulations that the Pakistani government would stop conducting 
attacks against the militants. The militants agreed to stop crossing the Afghani border, 
and have non-Pakistani fighters leave the country. The Pakistani army vacated its 
checkpoints and security bases. The tribal leaders agreed to not to form any shadow 
governments while the Pakistani government promised to honor local traditions and 
customs when dealing with local issues.  As well the Pakistani government agreed to pay 
condolences for property damage and civilian deaths.  These peace accords did not last 
long in Pakistan, and the army is still struggling to implement a solid counterinsurgency 
strategy inside the FATA and NWFP.124 If unable to establish control, and provide 
stability inside these regions, the Pakistani government will face a situation where the 
parallel states run by the militant groups may become too strong to dislodge without 
foreign assistance. The historic independence of the tribal population, combined with the 
insurgent know-how of the militant groups that Pakistan helped create and support, has 
the potential to create a situation that the Pakistani government is not capable of solving.   
Given Pakistan’s proximity to troubled regions in India and China, as well as central 
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Asian states like Afghanistan, any serious threat to the internal security of nuclear-armed 
Pakistan could quickly cause a catastrophic international crisis.   
Pakistan’s proxy strategy against India in Kashmir has been ultimately 
unsuccessful.  India has not ceded any territory in Jammu and Kashmir to anything but 
the conventional military clashes that have determined the current Line of Control 
between the two countries. India learned over time how to implement better 
counterinsurgency strategies inside Kashmir. This combined with the fundamentalist 
beliefs of the militant groups has turned most of the Kashmiri people against the militant 
groups and lessened their willingness to support them either actively or inactively.  While 
the ISI has added the tactic of using the drug trade against India in Kashmir, which 
demonstrates a creative approach to unconventional warfare, it is most likely a last-ditch 
effort.  Pakistan and the ISI will most likely continue their efforts at sustaining the 
insurgency in Jammu in Kashmir, this will allow them to continue forcing India to 
commit resources to the problem as Pakistan continues to try and level the playing field 
with their conventionally superior neighbor.  
 The very groups formed and supported by Pakistan now pose one of the most 
dangerous threats to its security.  The ISI is beginning to lose control of these irregular 
militants.  By supporting American efforts against militants in Afghanistan, the Pakistani 
government is now viewed as an enemy by many jihadi groups taking sanctuary inside 
Pakistan.  These groups are now more independent, and able to operate with the support 
of criminal networks.  This alternate support base requires less from the ISI, and allows 
the militant organizations to ignore any guidance from their former masters.  Unless 
Pakistan is able to more effectively conduct counterinsurgency operations against these 
groups in the FATA and NWFP, Pakistan may face crisis at the hands of a beast they 
created. 
 We make the assumption that Pakistan is somehow unable to deal with the 
insurgency in the FATA and NWFP. This leads to a notional crisis that requires Pakistan 
to request U.S. military assistance.  This notional scenario guides the use of a design 
structure matrix (DSM) in Chapter Six to focus on CF-SOF integration against such 
threats.  By developing what tasks are required of both the JTF and JSOTF to counter 
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emerging hybrid warfare threats in Pakistan; the DSM demonstrates where integration of 
the different forces would be beneficial, and where it would be detrimental. This 
functions as a way to demonstrate how planners and senior commanders can identify 





The previous chapters demonstrate that Chechnya and Pakistan are good 
representations of possible hybrid warfare scenarios.  This chapter utilizes the design 
structure matrix (DSM) to examine where interdependencies exist between the notional 
U.S. forces that would be called upon to respond to conflict in these areas.  We assume 
that the force would consist of both a JTF constituting the conventional forces in theater 
and a JSTOF constituting the special operations force.  The overall force would be 
controlled by a single commander, who along with the JTF and JSTOF commanders, 
would be required to determine what operations should be conducted with the JTF and 
JSOTF acting independently of each other, and what operations would require the JTF 
and JSTOF to combine for integrated operations.  The DSM provides this analysis by 
showing where the tasks of each force will intersect, and demonstrating if there is any 
benefit to combining CF-SOF efforts to complete specific tasks. While the values 
assigned in the DSM are subjective in the end, planners should rely on objective 
assessments of whether integration will yield benefits, make no difference, or cause harm 
to operations. 
A. CHECHNYA 
This section focuses on analysis of CF-SOF integration in respect to the notional 
hybrid warfare scenario that may develop in Chechnya.  The notional U.S. commander of 
the forces sent into a Chechnya intervention will be required to develop a campaign plan. 
For the purposes of this thesis, we assume that one commander has been appointed to 
control a JTF, the conventional forces element, and a JSOTF, the special operations 
forces element. The JTF is assumed to be an Army Corps Headquarters that will control 
conventional Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as its operational units.  The JSOTF is 
assumed to be a Special Forces Group Headquarters that will control its organic Special 
Forces teams as well as Civil Affairs and Military Information Support Operations 
elements. JTF and JSOTF elements will be required to operate simultaneously in the 
same environment to establish a security environment free of active violence conducted 
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by insurgent forces, with U.S. forces successfully withdrawn from the region and host 
nation security forces able to maintain security independent of U.S. assistance. 
The JTF and JSOTF are each assigned an initial list of tasks to accomplish, to be 
developed into their respective operations plans. The challenge this section examines, is 
that in a campaign against the hybrid threat seen in Chechnya, where does the 
commander find benefit in combining his JTF and JSOTF for integrated operations?  
The likely tasks assigned to the JTF, drawing on FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 
would be as follows: 
• Secure the populace 
• Isolate the insurgency 
• Identify and neutralize political and support infrastructure 
• Security Force Assistance (SFA) to Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF) 
• Transition control to HNSF 
• Employ HNSF with counterinsurgency (COIN) advisors 
• Establish local, regional, and national agencies and departments 
• Reestablish the justice system 
• Support and secure elections 
• Assist local government in providing essential services 
 
The likely tasks assigned to the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) 
would be as follows: 
• Counter Terrorism 
• Security Force Assistance to Host Nation Special Operations Forces 
• Military Information Support Operations (MISO, formerly PSYOP) 
• Civil Affairs  
• Intelligence, Special Reconnaissance 
• Direct Action 
• Counter-Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
 
Identifying task intersections (where interdependency) exist and assigning the 
corresponding values (as outlined in the methods chapter) produces a completed DSM. 
 53 
For example, looking at the JTF task Isolate the Insurgency, we contend that this task is 
better performed when integrated with the JSOTF tasks of Counter Terrorism. Both tasks 
support separating the insurgent from the population, and alienating those members of the 
insurgency that utilize terrorist strategies. Therefore, the value of integration at the task 
intersection is one (1), indicating that integrating CF-SOF for operations would be 
beneficial. Likewise, looking at the task intersections for the JTF task Reestablish the 
Justice System and the JSOTF task Counter Terrorism, conducting integrated operations 
aligned would not yield greater benefits. Therefore the task intersection here is zero (0), 
reflecting that integrating CF-SOF operations at this point makes no difference. 
Examining the remaining JTF and JSTOF tasks in this manner populates the DSM and 
creates the finished product seen in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.  Design Structure Matrix for Chechnya Case Study 
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B. SUMMARY  
The DSM applied to the Chechen scenario demonstrates several conclusions 
concerning the interrelated nature of the task list for both the JTF and JSOTF.  First, the 
DSM allows planners to identify which organization should assume primary 
responsibility for planning specific campaign tasks.  Second, planners can determine the 
manner, and the amount of integration required for each task.  In this scenario, there are 
several conventional force tasks that require supporting efforts from the special 
operations forces.  Alternatively, there are several conventional force tasks that play a 
supporting role to a primary Special Operations task.  These relationships are highlighted 
in the DSM by the vertical or horizontal alignment of the clusters.  A horizontal cluster 
suggests that the special operations task would be supported by the conventional forces 
tasks that lie along the vertical axis.  In the Chechnya DSM, task intersections where 
interdependency exists, and integration is beneficial were identified: 
• Integration is beneficial for the JTF tasks of Isolate the Insurgency and 
Identify and Neutralize Political and Support Infrastructure, with the 
JSOTF’s Counter Terrorism, SFA to HN SOF, MISO, CA, Special 
Reconnaissance, and Direct Action efforts.  As the JTF works to isolate 
the insurgency from the population and dismantle its support networks, 
coordinating efforts for the identified JTF and JSTOF tasks can prove 
critical. The vertical alignment of these clusters suggests that the JSOTF’s 
efforts will be supporting the JTF’s in these specific cases. 
• Integrated operations are beneficial for the JSOTF task of Security Force 
Assistance to HN SOF and the JTF tasks of Isolate the Insurgency, Identify 
and Neutralize Political and Support Infrastructure, Security Force 
Assistance to HN Security Forces (HNSF), Transition Control to HNSF, 
and Employ HNSF with COIN Advisors.  As the JSOTF works to conduct 
SFA focused on Chechen SOF elements, the JTF’s efforts focused on SFA 
to other Chechen security forces must be integrated to support the 
JSOTF’s advisory effort.  
• Integration is beneficial for the JSTOF’s Civil Affairs efforts and the JTF’s 
tasks of Isolate the Insurgency, Identify and Neutralize Political and 
Support Infrastructure Establish Local, Regional Agencies and 
Departments, Reestablish the Justice System, Support Secure Elections, 
and Assist the Local Government in Providing Essential Services.  
Integration of these tasks will ensure that all tasks aimed at creating a 
sustainable Chechen government, supported by its people, are conducted 
with unity of effort. The horizontal alignment of this cluster suggests that 
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the JSOTF would be the supported unit, with these specific JTF tasks 
supporting its efforts. 
C. PAKISTAN 
In the theoretical, illustrative case of Pakistan asking for U.S. military assistance 
for its counterinsurgency efforts in the North West Frontier Province and Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas, there would be a requirement for the JTF and JSOTF to 
develop campaign plans and decide where forces can conduct integrated operations for 
optimal effect.  The notional U.S. commander of the forces sent into a Pakistani 
intervention will be required to develop a campaign plan. Assumptions about the 
composition of the JTF and JSOTF have not changed from those for the Chechen 
scenario. JTF and JSOTF elements will be required to operate simultaneously in the same 
environment to accomplish U.S. objectives in the region. U.S. objectives in this case will 
be the establishment of security in the NWFP and FATA under the control of the 
Pakistani government, free of active violence conducted by insurgent forces, with U.S. 
forces successfully withdrawn from the region and Pakistani security forces able to 
maintain security independent of U.S. assistance.  The assistance to Pakistan would most 
likely focus on counterterror efforts and security force assistance to local forces 
conducting counterinsurgency operations. 
The JTF and JSOTF will each be assigned an initial list of tasks to accomplish, 
which would later be developed into their respective operations plans. The challenge this 
section examines, is that in a campaign against an opponent that employs hybrid warfare 
in Pakistan, where does the commander find benefit in combining his JTF and JSOTF for 
integrated operations?  
The likely tasks assigned to the Joint Task Force (JTF), drawing on FM 3-24 
Counterinsurgency, would be as follows: 
• Secure the populace 
• Isolate the insurgency 
• Identify and neutralize political and support infrastructure 
• Security Force Assistance to Host Nation Security Forces (HNSF)  
• Employ HNSF with counterinsurgency (COIN) advisors 
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• Establish local, regional, and national agencies and departments 
• Assist local government in providing essential services. 
 
The likely tasks assigned to the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) would be 
as follows: 
• Counter Terrorism 
• Security Force Assistance to Host Nation Special Operations Forces 
• Military Information Support Operations (MISO, formerly PSYOP) 
• Civil Affairs  
• Intelligence, Special Reconnaissance 
• Direct Action 
• Counter-Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
 
Identifying task intersections (where interdependency) exists and assigning the 
corresponding values (as outlined in the methods chapter) produces a completed DSM. 
For example, looking at the JTF task Isolate the Insurgency, we contend that this task is 
better performed when integrated with the JSOTF tasks of Military Information Support 
Operations, Civil Affairs, and Direct Action. All of these tasks support separating the 
insurgent from the population. Therefore, the value of integration at these task 
intersections is one (1), indicating that integrating CF-SOF for operations would be 
beneficial. Looking at the other task intersections for the JTF task Isolate the Insurgency, 
conducting integrated operations aligned with the remaining JSOTF tasks would not yield 
greater benefits. Therefore the rest of the task intersections in this column are zeros (0), 
indicating that integrating CF-SOF operations at these points makes no difference. This is 
not to say the remaining JSOTF tasks will not in some way support efforts at isolating the 
insurgency, only that CF-SOF integrated operations would not yield better results.  
Examining the remaining JTF and JSTOF tasks in this manner populates the DSM and 




Figure 5.  Design Structure Matrix for Pakistan Case Study 
From this completed DSM, we make the following conclusions regarding CF-SOF 
integration in the notional Pakistan campaign:  
• Integration is most beneficial with the JTF task of Identify and neutralize 
political and support infrastructure being supported by the JSOTF efforts 
of MISO, CA, Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, and Counter-
proliferation. The vertical alignment of this cluster suggests that the JTF 
would be the supported unit for this task while the JSTOF’s specified 
efforts function in a supporting role. 
• Integrated operations are beneficial with when conducted for the JSTOF 
task of Security Force Assistance to host nation SOF and the JTF tasks of 
Security Force Assistance to HNSF and Employ HNSF with 
counterinsurgency advisors. The horizontal alignment of this cluster 
suggests the JSTOF would be lead for Security Force Assistance efforts as 
the supported unit, with the JTF’s efforts acting in a supporting role. 
• Integrated efforts are beneficial when the JSOTF task of Direct Action is 
supported by the JTF tasks of Isolate the insurgency, identify and 
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neutralize political and support infrastructure, Security Force Assistance 
to HNSF, and Employ HNSF with counterinsurgency advisors. 
• The JTF task of Employ HNSF with COIN advisors benefits when 
integrated with the JSTOF’s SFA to host nation SOF, Direct Action, and 
Counter-proliferation operations. 
• The JTF task of Establish local, regional, and national agencies and 
departments should be integrated with the JSOTF Civil Affairs and MISO 
operations 
• The JSOTF Civil Affairs efforts are benefitted by integrating with the JTF 
tasks of Establish local, regional, and national agencies and departments, 
and Assist local government in providing essential services. 
D. SUMMARY 
The analysis utilizing the DSM allows the senior commander, with authority over 
both the JTF and JSOTF, to identify where integrated operations are best conducted.  It 
also allows the commander to visualize where keeping his forces independent is more 
effective.  The commander must designate which element is the supported and which is 
the supporting unit for each integrated effort. Identifying what operations will be 
integrated early allows respective planners from the JTF and JSOTF to focus their efforts, 
as opposed to developing separate campaign plans, and tasking tactical units to integrate 
when a need is identified. Staffs can then develop plans for completing specific tasks as 
integrated efforts with the JTF and JSOTF combined very early in the process. This early 
combination of staffs allows more time for planning both those tasks that require 
integration, and those that each force can accomplish independently.  
 One mechanism for accomplishing this integration during planning would be to 
form a temporary “integrated operations group” inside each element’s functional 
planning cell. These JTF-JSOTF integration cells would form to accomplish planning for 
tasks identified as requiring integration, complete operations planning for these tasks, and 
then re-form once operations begin and plans must be updated. 
The design structure matrix is a useful planning tool for determining when 
circumstances require integrated efforts between conventional and special operations 
forces.  Also importantly, it identifies areas where integration is not necessary, or when it 
will hinder operational efforts.  Its ease of use allows planners to quickly isolate those 
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areas where conventional and special operations forces in the notional situations for 
Chechnya and Pakistan benefit from clear lines of responsibility—and models future 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
As the international security environment evolves, the distinction between 
traditional forms of warfare will continue to converge as the number of weak, failing, or 
corrupt states increase.  In such cases, future adversaries will begin to develop a hybrid 
approach to warfare.  Additionally, non-state actors will gain greater access to 
technologically advanced weapons and equipment in weak or failing states.  For these 
reasons, we believe the U.S. military will face increasingly complex challenges in future 
operating environments.  In hybrid warfare, adversaries will attempt to blend 
conventional and unconventional capabilities to exploit the U.S. military’s vulnerabilities.  
This will challenge the U.S. Army to develop an integrated, multi-purpose force capable 
of conducting operating across the spectrum of operations.  To accomplish this, the Army 
must develop better ways to integrate and synchronize conventional and special 
operations forces on the battlefield. 
 Current doctrine focuses on three approaches to integrating conventional and 
special operations forces: operations, command relationships, and liaison elements.  JP 3-
05 highlights the importance of a combined effort between conventional and special 
operations forces during the planning and execution of operations.  Similarly, current 
doctrine emphasizes the importance of designating a single commander and staff that is 
representative of each unit within the task force.  Liaison elements are the most common 
approach to integration.  However, these elements are not full-time planners and do not 
remove the need to conduct staff to staff coordination.  More importantly, liaisons do not 
have the authority to make decisions without approval from their command element.  We 
suggest that in the future, conventional and special operations forces integration should 
be addressed with the following tenets in mind:  
• integration should be determined by the task, not the unit 
• integrated operations require a dedicated staff at the JTF level 
• the supported/supporting command relationship is most appropriate and 
should be determined by task  
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The design structure matrix (DSM) is a tool that the commander and his staff can use to 
ensure the efforts of conventional and special operations forces are effectively integrated. 
The DSM can be first used to identify where interdependency would be beneficial.  It 
also highlights tasks in which integration is not required or can be detrimental to mission 
accomplishment.   Second, the DSM can determine areas in which an integrating cell is 
required.  These cells may range from weekly working groups, liaison elements, and 
semi-permanent “integration” cells.  Finally, the JTF commander can use the DSM to 
determine the supported and supporting relationships between tasks by each unit.  This 
allows the JTF commander to assign primary responsibility for a line of effort to a 
specific element.   
 Prior to the Global War on Terror, the primary responsibility for operational tasks 
was clearly delineated between conventional and special operations forces.  However, 
conditions forced the Army to implement a more adaptive approach to traditional combat 
roles and organizational structures due to the complexity of the operating environments in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  As the international security environment continues to become 
increasingly complex, it remains a necessity that the U.S. Army be able to effectively 
integrate conventional and special operations forces in the future. It should be 
remembered that the goal is not to form indistinguishable organizations, but to maximize 
the synergy that can be achieved by leveraging the unique capabilities of each type of 
force. A useful tool for success is the DSM, which allows a commander to integrate his 
forces where high levels of interdependency exist, and to separate forces where they do 
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